contracts

The S&N approach is radically different. Their approach is to start with the assumption that they can use a short and simple contract. If they can’t find a good reason not to use this approach, they try to develop a contract that is stripped of as many legal terms as possible—and those that remain are as simple and short as possible.

It’s clear enough that eliminating archaisms such as WITNESSETH wouldn’t affect meaning. But what about eliminating the extraneous shall? Using shall outside of an obligation is sometimes just a distraction, as in This agreement shall be governed by the laws of the Province of Ontario—there’s no risk of the extranous shall affecting meaning. But it might be a different matter if you use shall when attempting to express a condition: as I discussed in this post and this post, it’s relatively commonplace for parties to dispute whether a given provision constitutes an obligation or a condition.

...As these enemies are entirely invisible and unknown, the methods taken to appease them are equally unaccountable,° and consist in ceremonies, observances, mortifications, sacrifices, presents, or in any practice, however absurd or frivolous, which either folly or knavery recommends to a blind and terrified credulity.° Weakness, fear, melancholy, together with ignorance, are, therefore, the true sources of SUPERSTITION.

But Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook dismissed such claims in the 14-page ruling. The reduced race was allowable under F1 rules, he wrote, "and once it is established that the plaintiffs received a regulation race, they admit that they had no additional right to a race that was exciting or drivers that competed well."

A plaintiff alleging tortious interference with a contractual relationship must establish five elements: (I) the existence of a valid and enforceable contract: (2) the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the contract; (3) the defendant's intentional inducement of the breach of the contract; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) damages resulting from the defendant's wrongful inducement of the breach. (citation omitted).

(a) the nature of the defendant's conduct;
(b) the defendant's motive;
(c) the interests of the plaintiff with which the defendant's conduct interferes;
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the defendant;
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the defendant and the contractual interests of the plaintiff;
(f) the proximate or remoteness of the defendant's conduct to the interference: and
(g) the relations between the parties.

In weighing all of these factors, we find this to be a very close call. And as noted above, the ultimate question relating to the justification of the defendant's conduct is whether that conduct has been fair and reasonable under the circurnstances. We find this inquiry to he so highly- fact sensitive that we conclude it is best answered by a factfinder. Although it is possible that under certain circumstances this question may lie answered as a matter of law-and, indeed, we make just such a finding with respect to WVA below- we do not find that to be the case with respect to Union, based primarily on its conduct with respect to the without cause termination provision....

But whereas some lawyers regard reasonable efforts as a misinterpretation-proof replacement for best efforts, others regard both terms as two points on a spectrum of efforts that a party might be required to expend, ranging from the relatively modest to the extraordinary, the latter being represented by best efforts. This interpretation is facilitated by colloquial use of reasonable to mean “not extreme,” as in She got a reasonable grade on her French test.

I think the problem is that people approach it as an issue to be resolved by case law, whereas I see it first of all as a matter of semantics. What does best efforts mean in general usage? And what are the implications of seeking to have it mean something other than that?